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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 July 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)
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SUBJECT : NIE 20-2-54: Probable Western European
Attitudes toward the NATO Alliance through
Mid-1955

1. The attached terms of reference were agreed on at the meeting of the IAC representatives on 19 July.

2. While OIR has primary responsibility for contributions, the Defense Agencies are invited to contribute not only to the military sections, but also to the entire paper.

3. It is requested that contributions be received in this Office by the close of business on 16 August.

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PAUL A. BOHEL
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 July 1954

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 20-2-54; PROBABLE WESTERN
EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NATO ALLIANCE
THROUGH MID-1955

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Western European attitudes toward the NATO
alliance, through mid-1955

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. CURRENT EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NATO ALLIANCE

- A. Briefly analyze current popular and governmental opinions concerning the value of the alliance to each NATO state. Describe briefly the effect upon the alliance of the attitudes of the governments and peoples of nonmember Western European countries toward NATO.
- B. Describe briefly current relations and the trends in relations among the allied states as these affect their attitude toward NATO, with particular emphasis upon the

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relations between the UK, France, West Germany, and Italy,
and the relations between these members and the US.

II. BASIC FACTORS IN NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO

An estimate on Western European attitudes toward the NATO alliance over the next year or so can probably be completed most easily if the contributors analyze the factors which will tend to tighten or strengthen relations among the allied states and the factors which will tend to weaken or disrupt the relations. A weighing and balancing of these factors will permit an estimate of the most likely developments or trends. We believe that the following factors, among others, should be weighed in these analyses.

- A. The political, economic, and military recovery of Western Europe and of the individual states of Western Europe, and the spirit which these successes have produced. In particular, how strong is the drive for "independence" and for each nation's pursuing its own local interests as opposed to those of its neighbors and of the NATO alliance as a whole?
- B. The estimates made by the peoples, the vocal and powerful minority groups, and the governments of Western Europe of:
 - (a) the Russian menace to Western Europe and the likelihood of general war, and (b) the nature and significance of internal Communist movements. Differences in the estimates of key allied states or groups on these matters.
- C. The allies' estimates of the significance to them of their ties with the US.

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- D. The attitude of allied governments and peoples concerning the US estimate of probable Soviet courses of action and concerning US policy, especially in the Far East.
- E. The working relations and habits created during the past five years.
- F. The common purposes and traditions of the allies, and the conflicting national interests of the allies, with especial reference to those of France and West Germany.
- G. The impact of the Trieste issue and Balkan alliance, especially upon Italy.
- H. The consequences of French ratification of EDC, or of French failure to act upon EDC. This involves estimates of the reaction of the various peoples and states, of the Soviet reaction and its impact, of the likelihood that various alternative proposals to EDC will be offered, of the various reactions to these alternatives, and of policy and political changes such French action might cause (especially in France, West Germany, and the UK).
- I. The attitude in West Germany and elsewhere toward rearming West Germany and the various national reactions to the rearming of West Germany.

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- J. Western European attitudes toward developments in Indochina, and the reaction to various alternative Western courses of action regarding Southeast Asia.
- K. Western European attitudes toward the relative growth of Soviet and of US military capabilities, with particular reference to developments in the nuclear field and in the development and production of guided missiles.
- L. Western European trade and cultural relations with the Bloc.

III. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

In view of the above factors, what is the prospective course of national attitudes? Will the cohesive forces tend to outweigh the centrifugal forces in the NATO alliance. Which forces are likely to prove most significant over the coming months? What are the likely Western European attitudes toward US policy and toward the Communist Bloc?